One of the main reasons why I renounced biblical fundamentalism was that I could no longer abide the intellectual embarrassment that it forced upon me. After years of trying to defend my beliefs with double-talk and hair-splitting of the type that we have just seen in Roger Hutchinson's article, I finally decided that no position is worth the shameful compromise of one's intellectual integrity that belief in the biblical inerrancy doctrine requires. In order to believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, one must convince himself that far-fetched, unlikely scenarios are legitimate explanations of highly probable contradictions, inconsistencies, and other discrepancies, and one must believe that there was a time when supernatural events such as the parting of the Red Sea, the sun standing still in the sky, humans walking unharmed through a fiery furnace, angels dropping in for visits, the resurrecting of the dead, and such like happened with routine regularity. As I have said repeatedly in past articles, skeptics who reject such claims as these are merely being critically consistent in the way that they evaluate ancient literature. They do not accept such biblical claims for the same reason that they do not accept similar nonbiblical claims. Supernaturalism is completely contrary to what is observed today, and so there is no rational reason to believe that supernaturalism occurred in ancient times, especially not with the frequency that is claimed in the literature of the past.
Now along comes Roger Hutchinson double talking and splitting hairs in a vain attempt to give a semblance of respectability to the irrational position that biblical miracle claims should be believed for no other reason than that they are recorded in the Bible. He began by accusing me of misunderstanding Michael Horner's argument. "The `a priori assumption' underlying Horner's argument is not that God exists or that God interferes in human affairs," Hutchinson said. "The assumption is that the historical account of God's actions, as recorded in the Bible, is true." It was at this point that the double talk and hair-splitting began, for Hutchinson went on to say, "If we make the a priori assumption that the Biblical account is true, then the miracles it describes require a supernatural agent to cause them." He then concluded that Horner wasn't arguing that miracles happened because God exists but that Horner knows that God exists because miracles happened, and Horner knows that miracles happened because of his "a priori assumption" that what the Bible says is true.
If Hutchinson were a dog, he would probably entertain himself by chasing his tail, so let's work our way though his mumbo jumbo by first noticing that he is begging a question he is obligated to prove. He said that "the historical account of God's actions, as recorded in the Bible, is true," so he apparently was not content to begin with just one a priori assumption, i. e., what the Bible says is true, but he tried to sneak another one in too, i e., the Bible is a "historical account of God's actions." By the same "logic," a Mormon could prove that the Book of Mormon is a "historical account of God's actions," and so all miracles recorded in it actually happened, and a Muslim could prove the same thing about the Qur'an. Like most biblical inerrantists, Roger Hutchinson seems unable to grasp the truth of the logical axiom that says what proves too much proves nothing at all. I have yet to hear a biblical inerrantist explain the value of "a priori assumptions" that could be used to prove the historical accuracy of any and all miracle claims, both ancient and modern. Perhaps Hutchinson would like to give it a try.
Did I misunderstand Horner's argument? Although Hutchinson wasn't even at the Seattle debate, he seems qualified to say that I didn't understand Horner's argument, and so I need him to explain it to me. After all, I was only Horner's opponent in the debate, so what do I know? Well, for starters, I know that Horner's argument was exactly what I said, i. e., the existence of God would make miracles possible. As he was concluding his first speech, Horner said, "As long as it's even possible that God exists, miracles are possible. What one should do, then, is try to honestly answer the question: What does the evidence suggest is the most plausible explanation for the data?" (transcript published by Skepticism, Inc., p. 8). Horner's "data" were simply the New Testament accounts of what had allegedly happened, so if his argument was what Hutchinson claims, this would have been an ideal place to say, "If we make the a priori assumption that the Biblical account is true, then the resurrection it describes required a supernatural agent to cause it; hence, we can know that God existed to cause the resurrection, because the New Testament account of the resurrection is true, and if the resurrection account is true, then God must exist." To his credit, Horner was a bit more sophisticated in his debating style than to chase his tail in this fashion. My advice to Hutchinson is that he keep his day job, because I don't see much of a career for him in public debating.
If we make the a priori assumption that the Biblical account is true.... I'd like for Hutchinson to explain to us why anyone should make such an assumption as this. When I read a history book, I don't read it with the assumption that everything it says is true, and I seriously doubt that Hutchinson would accord this special consideration to any other book. Books, after all, are written by humans, and humans are prone to make mistakes. I recently acquired a copy of The Histories by Cornelius Tacitus, a 1st-century Roman senator and historian during the reigns of Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian, the time that most New Testament critics believe the synoptic gospels were written. I am not reading this book with the a priori assumption that it is a completely accurate account of 1st-century Roman history. Why should I? However, if I did read it from that perspective, I would have to believe some things that no doubt seemed rational to people in the superstitious times in which Tacitus lived but which would be completely imbecilic for people of enlightened times to believe really happened.
The book tells of a prophecy that Basilides, a priest of the "local god" on Mount Carmel--yes, the Mount Carmel of the Bible--made by reading the entrails of an animal that Vespasian sacrificed. The prophecy was that whatever Vespasian was "planning," it would be granted him, and he would have a "great mansion, far-flung boundaries and a host of people" (Translation by Kenneth Wellesley, Penguin Books, 1995, p. 129). Vespasian was, of course, aspiring at the time to become emperor, and so if one assumes that this work of Tacitus is an accurate report of 1st-century Roman history, he could prove (by Hutchinson's logic) that this accurate prophecy made by reading entrails actually happened.
Tacitus also told of a case of teletransportation that involved another Basilides, this one a "leading Egyptian," who appeared to Vespasian as he was in the "holy house of Serapis" to "consult the god on matters of state." After this experience, Vespasian asked the priests of Serapis if Basilides had been in the temple that day and then inquired of others if Basilides had been seen in the city. Finally, he sent a "party on horse, and ascertained that at the relevant time [Basilides] had been eighty miles away" (p. 273). Vespasian's conclusion was that he had experienced a divine vision, whose significance lay "in the meaning of the name Basilides," which in Greek meant "king's son." Hence, Vespasian was convinced that this was another omen that he was destined for greatness.
Does Roger Hutchinson believe that such miracles as these actually happened? I seriously doubt it, but why wouldn't consistency require him to so believe? After all, he accepts as completely accurate a New Testament story of teletransportation when Jesus allegedly appeared suddenly out of nowhere to his disciples, who were in a room with closed doors (Luke 24:36; John 20:19). If Hutchinson can assume the accuracy of this story and thereby know that God, the causative agent, exists, then why should I not assume the accuracy of Tacitus' history of Vespasian and thereby know that the god Serapis exists? After all, reasoning like Hutchinson's should cut both ways. If not, why not?
In John 9:1-7, there is an account of a miracle that Jesus performed by mixing clay with saliva and anointing the eyes of a man born blind, who was then healed by washing away the clay at the pool of Siloam. The synoptic gospels tell of another miracle of Jesus in healing a man with a withered hand (Matt. 12:9-13; Mark 3:1-5; Luke 6:6-10). Hutchinson's "logic" will lead him to assume that these are accurate accounts of "God's actions," and so he can know from this assumption that God, the causative agent, exists. However, Tacitus told of two strikingly similar miracles that emperor Vespasian performed by putting the "water of his mouth" on the cheeks and eyeballs of a blind man and by treading with his foot on the withered hand of another man (p. 272). These two miracles were also attested to by the Roman historian Suetonius, who claimed that the two men had been sent to Vespasian by the god Serapis (The Twelve Caesars, translation by Robert Graves, Penguin Books, 1989, p. 284). Perhaps Hutchinson can explain to us why he does not assume the accuracy of the reports by these two Roman historians and thereby conclude that the god Serapis also exists.
There are many more examples of miracle claims in the works of Tacitus and Suetonius that I could cite, but these are sufficient to make a point that Hutchinson needs to address. He said that "(n)body has seen God, but people have witnessed miracles" and that "(t)he parting of the Red Sea was a supernatural activity witnessed by the writer of Exodus." How does Hutchinson know that the parting of the Red Sea was witnessed by the writer of Exodus? How else? He assumed it. "Assuming that it is a true account," he said, "we can conclude that a supernatural agent exists who caused it," and then he added, "Not surprisingly, this agrees with the Biblical record."
Well, duh, can't Hutchinson see that this same way of reasoning could prove the "truth" of any religious miracle claims and the existence of the god(s) who caused them to happen? Let's take Hutchinson's "logic" and apply it to the miracle claims of Tacitus and Suetonius. Nobody has seen Serapis, but people have witnessed miracles. People witnessed Vespasian's healing of the blind man and the man with the withered hand. Tacitus, in fact, said that "(b)oth these incidents are still vouched for by eye-witnesses, though there is now nothing to be gained by lying" (p. 273). Suetonius claimed that both miracles were done "in the presence of a large audience" (p. 284). Assuming, then, that these are true accounts, we can conclude that a supernatural agent exists who caused them. Not surprisingly, this conclusion agrees with the historical records of Tacitus and Suetonius. Maybe now Hutchinson will have a little more appreciation for the logical axiom that says what proves too much proves nothing at all, but I doubt it.
Building on the assumption: There seemed to be no end to Hutchinson's convoluted logic. He objected to my saying that "Horner assumes that God intervenes in human affairs to perform miracles," but I have quoted above where Horner said exactly that. Hutchinson argued that "(n)o such assumption is necessary because the Bible clearly states that this is exactly what God does," but can't Hutchinson see that this begs the question of biblical inerrancy? How willing would he be to accept the premise that one can know that the god Serapis intervenes in human affairs to perform miracles because Tacitus and Suetonius clearly stated that this is exactly what Serapis does? He would never accept this as a convincing line of reasoning, yet he apparently said with serious intention that Christian apologists can build on the assumption that "the Bible provides a true record of historical events" and thereby "conclude that God exists and that God intervenes in human affairs." Yes, and Roman history buffs could build on the assumption that Tacitus and Suetonius provided a true record of historical events and thereby conclude that Serapis exists and that Serapis intervenes in human affairs. This kind of argumentation may be convincing to Hutchinson, but I suspect he would be hard pressed to find very many Christian apologists who see any merit in it.
Why not make the opposite assumption? Arguments are no better than the assumptions on which they rest, so for arguments to be sound, they must be based on assumptions for which reasonable evidence of their truth can be shown. This is what makes Hutchinson's argument ludicrously unsound. Of all the millions of books that have ever been written, Hutchinson has taken only the Bible and given it a special status that he will accord no other book. He has idolized it with the assumption that everything--not just some things but everything--the Bible says is true. But what are his grounds for beginning with this assumption? He has none except for his obvious desire that it be this way. The unlikeliness that his assumption is true is evident in all of the controversy that surrounds the biblical inerrancy doctrine. Christian apologists have built an entire industry around publishing books intended to "explain" thousands of inconsistencies, discrepancies, and contradictions that critics have identified in the Bible. That some of their resolutions of these discrepancies are correct is undoubtedly true, but one would have to be hopelessly naive to believe that all of these explanations--many of them ridiculously far-fetched--are correct. Thus, the evidence against the truth of Hutchinson's assumption is overwhelming, but, being a biblical inerrantist, he will not let this deter him in his belief that the Bible is a completely accurate "account of God's actions."
The absurdity of Hutchinson's assumption can be demonstrated by imagining an argument based on the opposite assumption, i. e., the Bible is errant in everything it says. If someone should seriously propose this as an assumption by which the Bible should be evaluated, he would accuse him/her of total unobjectivity, but he sees no unobjectivity in assuming the opposite, that the Bible is inerrant in everything it says. He might argue that the absurdity of assuming complete biblical errancy can be demonstrated by the obvious fact that the Bible contains information whose correctness can be verified. In this, I believe he would be correct, but if someone didn't mind appearing ridiculous, he could use inerrantist apologetic methods and explain away every verifiable fact recorded in the Bible just as "effectively" as inerrantists resolve biblical discrepancies.
Space won't permit me to apply inerrantist methods to established facts in the Bible to show how easily this could be done, so I will just modify the assumption. Let's suppose that someone should seriously argue that all information in the Bible that cannot be verified is erroneous. We cannot verify that Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, etc. were real people; therefore, the Bible is wrong in saying that they once existed. We cannot verify that Judas betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver; therefore, the Bible is wrong in saying that this event happened. We assume that everything recorded in the Bible that cannot be verified as truth is erroneous. If we did this, Hutchinson would accuse us of an incredibly radical prejudice, yet he expects us to consider him the epitome of objectivity as he assumes that everything in the Bible is inerrant, an assumption that is every bit as unreasonable as its opposite.
If the Christian god is the true and living God, then all other gods must be false. Ah, yes, but there's the rub. A conclusion is only as sound as the assumptions on which it is based, and the simple act of assuming that the Christian god is the true and living God doesn't make it so. No doubt Hutchinson is thoroughly convinced that his god is the true and living God, but he is no more convinced of this than a Muslim is that his god is the true god. Hutchinson boasted that the skeptic "cannot discount the possibility that God can exist or that God can cause miracles," but a Hindu could just as validly argue that Hutchinson cannot discount the possibility that Vishnu can exist or that Vishnu can cause miracles. So what is the value in an argument that can be used to prove just about anything or everything? Rather than chasing his tail as Hutchinson did throughout his article, his time would have been better spent if he had offered some convincing evidence that his god does exist and that he inspired the writing of the Bible. He didn't do that, though, because he knows that no such evidence exists. Thus, he spent his time demanding, in effect, that skeptics prove that his god does not exist and that the Bible is not inerrant.
The price we pay. Even Hutchinson seemed to recognize the strength of the skeptical approach to evaluating miracle claims, because he admitted at the end of his article that it is a "reasonable" method. He thinks, however, that the method comes with a price. By rejecting miracles because they "cannot be corroborated in some scientific manner," he said, "the skeptic may actually reject truth, but that is the price to be paid for guarding against the acceptance of something that is false." It has probably never occurred to Hutchinson that by accepting unverifiable fabulous claims just because they are found in a particular book, he has probably accepted falsehood. That, of course, is the price to be paid for excessive gullibility, and if I have to choose between the two, I would much rather err on the side of caution than gullibility. Needless to say, I believe that when I reject claims about talking animals, dead people returning to life, people once living for centuries, and such like, the chance that I am rejecting truth is so minimal that it doesn't even deserve consideration.
The current base of knowledge. A favorite inerrantist defense of biblical miracles is that one cannot assume that miracles did not happen in the past because they don't happen now, and so at the end of a discourse that proved absolutely nothing, Hutchinson finally retreated to this sanctuary of last resort. "(T)he `standards' that skeptics apply are nothing more than judgments based on the current base of knowledge," he said, but what better standard can one use in evaluating historical claims, especially fabulous claims, than the "current base of knowledge"? Does he have any evidence at all that the past was not like the present in terms of what can and cannot happen? If so, he should present it. If not, he should recognize that this is a poor defense of biblical miracle claims.
"Macro-Evolution": Evolution falls outside the scope of the publishing purpose of TSR, so I will not comment on Hutchinson's citing of "macro-evolution" as an example of skeptics "believ[ing] what they want to believe," except to say that he can only wish that he had a fraction of the evidence for miracles that science has for what he calls "macro-evolution." If he had anywhere near that much evidence for biblical miracles, this discussion would never even have started, because I would be a strong advocate of biblical miracles.
He did, however, show a flagrant inconsistency by bringing this
up on the heels of his disparaging comment about the "current base of
knowledge" that skeptics rely on, for if miracles should not be
evaluated by our "current base of knowledge," then evolution shouldn't
either. Creationists, however, will invariably attack evolution on the
grounds that life cannot come from nonlife, which is an argument that
the past should be evaluated by our "current base of knowledge." His
attack on evolution is therefore as inconsistent as his defense of
biblical inerrancy. "Liar," then, is a label better suited for his side.
