Kuchar defends an Argument from Nonbelief against God's existence (ANB) similar to that argued by J. L. Schellenberg, which differs in some respects from that argued by Theodore Drange. In short, the mere existence of nonbelievers or the presence of sufficient evidence for nonbelief in God's existence is incompatible with God given a certain description of him.
"I argue that Pardi's criticisms of Drange's version of the argument from nonbelief (ANB) do not refute ANB, although they may or may not require peripheral corrections or clarifications on Drange's part. I focus not so much on Drange's formulation, but on what I take to be the central intuitions of ANB and on the inadequacy of Pardi's objections. I assume some familiarity with Pardi's paper and with ANB, although I present what I consider to be ANB's central claims."
Here are two questionable propositions the theologian repeatedly offers. (1) God respects our free will so much that he allows non-believers to do their own thing for eternity in hell. (2) God loved us so much that he forgave our sins by punishing Jesus instead of sinners. Both propositions have the same problem: the language used refutes itself.
Christianity is based on the unusual idea of sacrificial punishment. The atonement has been interpreted in different ways, but the explanation stemming from some of the more vocal apologists is that of substitution. Curious concepts are employed to make sense of the central idea. When examined, these explanations turn out to be incoherent, a fact which casts doubt on the truth of Christianity's central concept, that Jesus' death was a sacrifice.
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